

# **More of the Same? The Position of the Four Largest Canadian Provinces in the World of Welfare Regimes**

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**More of the Same?  
The Position of the Four Largest Canadian  
Provinces in the World of Welfare Regimes\***

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## **Abstract**

Following the seminal work of Gøsta Esping-Andersen, many studies have identified a variety of welfare regimes in advanced Western societies. Analyzing a set of quantitative indicators, using hierarchical cluster analysis, we have confirmed, in earlier work (Saint-Arnaud and Bernard, 2003), the existence of four regimes, the three originally proposed by Esping-Andersen – social-democratic, liberal, and conservative – to which one must add, as many authors have pointed out, a fourth regime, distinct from the latter, called familialistic. We examine here, using the same methodological approach, the situation of the four largest Canadian provinces – Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia – in the middle of the 1990s. Does their belonging to the same country make them similar to each other and close to the average profile of Canada, a liberal country, or, on the contrary, do they display notable divergences, stemming from economic, political and cultural differences which would translate into their social policies, largely under provincial control in the Canadian federation? The results indicate modest, albeit significant, variations: Alberta somewhat resembles the “ultra-liberal” United States, while Quebec leans in the direction of Europe, and to some extent, of social-democracy.



## More of the Same? The Position of the Four Largest Canadian Provinces in the World of Welfare Regimes<sup>1</sup>

Several studies inspired by the innovative work of Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), most of them qualitative, have confirmed the presence and persistence of significant distinctions in terms of social policy organization in advanced societies. We returned to these analyses in a recent article (Saint-Arnaud and Bernard, 2003), making use of quantitative indicators, however, and multiple variable methods of analysis, which enabled us to test various welfare regimes typologies, and to examine more systematically their contours, their recent development and, in particular, the reasons for their resilience.

In an extension of that work, we would now like to incorporate the four largest Canadian provinces – Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia – into the analysis to see which regime they belong to. The objective is to determine whether being part of the same country makes them similar to each other and close to the country's average characteristics or whether, on the contrary, they have significant divergences, corresponding to economic, political and cultural differences among them, which might be expressed because several of the key social policy intervention instruments are under provincial control.

After reviewing the notion of welfare regimes, we will summarize the steps we took in our study of about twenty advanced societies (most of them OECD countries), and the primary results. Having thus set the scene, we will review the main factors leading to convergence of the provinces' welfare regimes, and the factors that, on the contrary, lead us to believe that they will be different from each other. We will then present the results and conclude that there are significant differences, albeit limited in scope.

### Welfare Regimes in Advanced Societies

Based on an analysis of the arrangements between the market, the state and the family, Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) categorized advanced capitalist societies into three types of institutional arrangements, designed to reconcile economic development and protection of citizens with the risks of the marketplace: the social-democratic regime in the Scandinavian countries, in which the emphasis is on equality, giving the state a considerable role; the liberal regime, primarily in Anglo-Saxon countries (including, to a large extent, Canada), in which the emphasis is more on liberty, making markets the key institution; and the conservative regime, in most western European countries, in which the principal of solidarity dominates with insurance plans often based on occupational activity. Using Esping-Andersen's model, Leibfried (1992), Ferrera (1996) and Bonoli (1997) added a fourth type to the typology, which they called "Latin" because it was found mainly in southern European countries, but which would be better called familist: solidarity is based mainly in the family, which plays the determining role in welfare distribution.

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<sup>1</sup> We would like to thank the *Institut de la statistique du Québec*, and the SSHRCC's strategic research program on social cohesion for their support of our work.

Research to establish the contours of such regimes from an inductive typological analysis, grouping countries based on a large number of quantitative indicators, is still relatively rare, even though Esping-Andersen, himself, (1990, 1999) and several other researchers (see Arts and Gelissen, 2002) have created indices to measure de commodification and various aspects of stratification in advanced societies.<sup>2</sup> Hierarchical cluster analysis, which we are using here, groups together countries which have similar characteristics compared across a number of variables and forms homogenous empirical types (Rapkin and Luke, 1993). It is called hierarchical because it divides all the cases (the countries) into subsets which become increasingly numerous and specific, based on the distance measured between the cases, taking into account their position across all the indicators under analysis. To put it more simply, it is like asking the model to divide the cases into two subsets which are as homogenous as possible internally, and as different as possible one from the other (based on the multidimensional distance between the cases). Once the two subsets are determined, the same task is carried out on each of them, and so on in a chain. We will return later to the issue of the number of successive subdivisions necessary.

This method is inductive in that the groupings are based exclusively on similarities among the cases in terms of a large number of indicators, representing various aspects of welfare regimes, without initially and arbitrarily assigning greater weight to any of them. Thus, the results depend basically on the choice of cases and indicators, since the methodological rules used are hardly controversial.<sup>3</sup> With respect to the countries chosen, we confined ourselves to the ones considered in the common analyses, since our work is intended as confirmation.

As for the choice of indicators, we wanted to capture the notion of welfare regimes in all its scope and historical nature; for this reason we retained three sets of indicators: indicators of *social situations*, *public policy* and *civic participation* by citizens (a detailed list can be found in table 1, below). By social situations, we mean what citizens experience in the areas of economic activity and employment, forms of family life, health and education. To a significant extent, these situations are determined by public policy (whether minimalist or more interventionist). These policies themselves (e.g., the place of the state and its policies on education, health, employment and material well-being) are influenced by citizens' civic participation (through

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<sup>2</sup> In fact, we know of hardly any other than the work of Obinger and Wagschal (2001), which is certainly interesting, but has some weaknesses: in their hierarchical cluster analysis, the researchers include, on the one hand, some variables which are too general to characterize welfare regimes adequately, and on the other hand, variables about the political orientation of the parties in power in the various countries, which seems to us to mar the process with a certain degree of circularity (see our critique in Saint-Arnaud and Bernard, 2003). Hicks and Kenworthy (2003) have just published a very interesting study which uses principal component analysis to isolate two dimensions of welfare regimes: progressive liberalism and traditional conservatism. They indicate (2003: 54, n.13) that they performed a cluster analysis (targeting three groups) which reproduced almost country by country a classification similar to Esping-Andersen's.

<sup>3</sup> We adopted the most standard procedures for hierarchical cluster analysis: "Euclidean square" distance (with reproduction of analyses using "block," "Euclidean," "Minkowski" and "Chebychev" distances to verify the robustness of our results), and Ward's amalgamation method. We standardized all variables on a scale from 0 to 1, to prevent some variables measured with high cardinal numbers dominating the analysis. To verify robustness, we also withdrew each of the variables from our analyses in turn, to ensure that none of them was solely dominating and artificially determining the results. Application of the Tukey "b" and "F" tests also allowed us to determine which variables contributed significantly to grouping the cases (the results of the latter test will be shown in table 2). When we withdrew the other variables from the model, we got results which were very similar to the ones we are presenting here. The reader may consult the original article (Saint-Arnaud and Bernard, 2003) for more details.

voting, the intensity of political discussion and union activity); this participation reflects in turn, although in complex ways, the social situations that citizens are experiencing (see Milner, 2002).

We believe that there is a mutual causality among these three elements: political participation reflects and interprets social situations, thereby contributing to orienting public policy; public policy in turn transforms social situations and gives rise to new mobilizations and modes of participation. Thus, social-democratic societies, for example, give the state a key role in correcting social inequality and this political action, the effectiveness of which translates into more egalitarian social situations, is based on citizen involvement in social issues and situations such as work arrangements, gender equity, universal access to education and health care, etc. In contrast, liberal societies have fewer public policies that attempt to limit the development of social inequality, which tends over time to yield relatively low levels of citizen involvement in social issues. Indeed, by examining the phenomenon of regime reinforcement, we are extending Esping-Andersen's perspective. He never considered welfare regimes as able to be reduced to a simple list of the various countries' social policies. Quite the contrary, from the beginning, he emphasized "the historical characteristics of states, especially the history of political class coalitions as the most decisive cause[s] of welfare-state variations" (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 1).

A classification approach such as ours raises one serious objection: each country might display a situation which is far too complex to be characterized as simply belonging to a single type. Of course, this criticism can be made of the process of developing any typology, not only of the quantitative approach we are using to do so. Arts and Gelissen (2002) discuss this extensively, demonstrating persuasively the heuristic potential of such types in a relatively new scientific field; to this end, one must avoid sacralizing these types, and instead, represent the basic features of the situation, revealing the forest rather than the myriad of unique trees – even though, of course, these individual characteristics are undeniable, and even though some cases are difficult to classify as only one type. In fact, types and individual characteristics are both recognizable and they can each reveal things about the other: it is against the backdrop of broad types, developed using the features of all societies, that the individual features of each will stand out. Most societies do fall primarily into one type, though they may display some features characteristic of other types.

It is true, as Théret (1997) states, that an inductive approach such as this, inspired by the Weberian ideal-type approach, is not as theoretically ambitious as the genetic structuralism proposed by that author. But it does share some points with the latter. Firstly, the indicators used, very different, enable us to get an idea of the sharing of responsibilities in the various countries among the market, state and family as producers and distributors of material well-being, which is the basis of Théret's approach. Certainly, the statistical indicators used, particularly those representing policy, are taken from the large listings of international bodies and consequently often emphasize budgetary data; it would be desirable to go further into institutional mechanisms and cost and benefit distribution parameters.<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, the data available allow us, because of the abundance and diversity of indicators, to trace systematically the largest divisions among

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<sup>4</sup> This would allow us to pursue the avenues of research opened up by the fascinating article by Goodin and Rein (2001), examining the complex and changing arrangements between, on the one hand, welfare regimes which determine who receives benefits and under what conditions and, on the other hand, the pillars of welfare, which instead describe who provides the benefits and who pays for them.



countries. Moreover, these divisions are stable over time, at least through the 1980s and 1990s (Saint-Arnaud and Bernard, 2003), and that resilience is probably related to the phenomenon of mutual reinforcement among social situations, public policy and civic participation that we have just mentioned; this attention to that phenomenon is a second area where our approach is similar to Théret's.

Thirdly, Théret recognizes merit in the inductive approach when it is used to evaluate the distance between ideal-types and particular cases (Théret, 1997: 203).<sup>5</sup> That is precisely what we want to do here: we are looking at the Canadian case and the case of four provinces, precisely to situate them against the welfare regimes we have identified, in order to assess to what extent subnational entities differ from the national society and display features from different models.

Our previous comparative work (Saint-Arnaud and Bernard, 2003), based on a hierarchical cluster analysis of 20 OECD countries and 36 indicators (20 relating to public policy, 12 to social situations and 4 to civic participation),<sup>6</sup> enabled us to categorize advanced societies into four sets which do indeed include the countries expected. We found the main liberal countries (Canada, United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia), conservative countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands), social-democratic countries (Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark) and familist countries (Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal). We chose to confine ourselves to this four-way division because (unlike more extensive subdivisions) it produced sets of countries which could be interpreted in the light of the existing literature. Indeed, an inductive process like ours is pointless when it is isolated; but when, as is the case here, researchers have considered several different variants for categorizing welfare regimes, an analysis such as ours gives one of these variants significantly greater plausibility than the others.

We then reviewed our hierarchical cluster analyses *separately* for each of the three sets of social indicators we identified (we will not present these results here), and we found the same groupings of countries by regimes in each of them. Thus, everything seems to indicate that, once these regimes are established, they dominate the economic, social and political scene of the various countries to such an extent that they give the same "colour" to their social situations, government programs and citizens' civic commitment; each element bears the specific imprint of the action of the other two. These three elements strengthen each other, thus producing the resilience that characterizes welfare regimes.

In these analyses, Canada clearly belongs to the liberal welfare regime. There is nothing surprising in this, given its geographical proximity to and the intensity of its economic exchange with the United States, in particular (Banting, 1996). However, the data in the "Canada" column in Table 1 shows that, on some points, it is closer to the social-democratic, conservative or familist profiles. Government action is slightly more pronounced and social situations are getting slightly closer, on some points, to the ones prevailing in Europe. However, political participation remains relatively low, particularly compared with social-democratic countries.

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<sup>5</sup> This is similar to the comments from Arts and Gelissen (2002) that a typology is only useful if it can be used to accomplish another task, which is precisely our objective here.

<sup>6</sup> The variables used are taken from statistical listings from the OECD, the United Nations, UNICEF, the World Bank, some work by Knack and Keefer (1997), the United States site Social Security Online, the "World Values Survey" and Statistics Canada. Information on the detailed statistical sources is given in the appendix to this article.

## Disparate Provinces?

Is it possible that the Canadian exceptions to the liberal profile might reflect disparities between the provinces, particularly the largest ones, which are able to make their mark on national indicators? Might some provinces take advantage of their control over several areas of social policy to give those areas, and the resulting social situations, an orientation which reflects their own political culture?

If this were the case, national averages might be misleading. We might even think that the choice of the nation-state as the unit of analysis in welfare regime research is problematic, particularly for federal countries, since such averages might camouflage significant subnational differences, as Martin (1997: 151) alleges.

Most studies evaluating the extent of differences between the public policies of Canadian provinces compare them to each other. The activity is important and interesting, but it is different from ours, which instead uses an international standard, situating these provinces against a set of advanced countries belonging to various regimes, so as to take the actual measure of our national and regional identities.

We must clearly state from the outset that the indicators available for analysis go back to 1996 and 1997. Therefore, they do not record the effects of several major changes in social policy which occurred at about that time. The first of these was the federal government's fight against the budget deficit: according to Théret (1999: 173-175), the cuts sharply reduced the proportion of federal transfers to provincial budgets (except for income tax points), from 20 percent in 1995 to 14.7 percent in 1997. Secondly, there was the coming to power, in 1995, of a neo-liberal government in the most heavily populated Canadian province, Ontario, a change which Alberta had experienced two years earlier and which occurred in British Columbia in 2001 and in Quebec in 2003.

Nonetheless, a comparison based on data preceding these changes is of great interest: in fact, it is important to establish the situation of the Canadian provinces at the start of the changes, which will provide a standard for evaluating them. Might the federal government's financial "call to order" in the mid-1990s, combined with the ideological climate of the period and competitive pressures in an economy oriented toward exporting – very largely to the United States, a very liberal country – have reduced the provinces' flexibility? We will probably have to wait for the mid-2000s to see more clearly.

Nonetheless, the data available, about the mid-1990s, are also interesting in themselves. As has been clearly shown by Morel (2002), reflection on social policy reform in a context of perceived poverty of resources has been present since at least the start of the 1990s in most provinces and this gives rise to experimentation. We will be able to perceive the initial effects in some provinces and probably first in the neo-liberal pioneer, Alberta. However, it is in the very nature of welfare regimes to evolve relatively slowly; and this is increasingly true when we consider in our indicators not only public policy, which may change quickly, but also the latter's repercussions on social situations, which in many cases take longer to manifest themselves.

Thus, we will be able to evaluate the extent to which the four provinces we are studying have developed, up until 1996-97, and through multiple, contradictory pressures, a distinct arrangement among the market, state and family in producing and distributing material well-being.

Which then are the various pressures determining this evolution? The literature on Canadian social policy is obviously extensive. However, most of the time, it covers fairly specific policies, whereas our objective is to perform an overall evaluation of these differences and their consequences on social situations. Therefore, we will target our literature review on the global factors likely to favour either similarities among the provinces or, on the other hand, disparities among them.

## **Factors of Convergence and Divergence**

It must be said immediately that we will find factors pushing in both of these directions; that reflects the characteristic tensions of a federation, where debates on social inequalities often translate into intergovernmental rivalries and compromises, and where balances are never established. We have also tried to distribute these factors into three categories: economic, political and cultural, even though their action obviously tends to overlap and combine.

### **Restrictive Economic Factors?**

The importance of economic factors in building social policy is obviously manifest in discourse on fiscal consolidation and the need to reduce the tax burden. But it is also seen in the state's institutional functioning: according to Jenson and Thompson (1999: 38), the ministries of finance are playing an increasingly direct, front-line role in developing social policy.

According to Banting (1996), the state's reaction to the challenges of the global economy is negotiated in such debates, through a set of contradictory pressures. On the one hand, the significance of national borders would rapidly decrease, with instant financial transactions, inter-company trade and the use of inexpensive labour which is not always unskilled. Advanced countries' social programs are therefore subject to enormous economic pressures by capital which has become very mobile. On the other hand, however, the increase in social inequalities resulting from these same trends leads to demands and resistance – from the union movement but also from movements representing women, seniors, etc. These translate primarily into a bifurcation between the American model, which does not lack employment but does not necessarily protect against poverty, and Europe, which has the inverse characteristics (albeit with variants depending on the country).

However, according to Helliwell (1996, 1998), using the “gravity” model to study the flow of trade between Canada and the United States, and between the Canadian provinces and their partners, interprovincial trade is twenty times more intense than this model predicts, when compared with trade with the United States. With a few variants, this is true for goods and for services, before and after the Free-Trade Agreement, for Quebec and for the other provinces. Helliwell's conclusion (1997: 7, 19): “the economic fabric of nation-states has a much tighter weave than previously thought” and “there is still scope for national policies in the global economy.”

Therefore, whereas Banting believes that the homogenizing influence of global and regional economic forces is countered only by the resistance of social movements, mobilized in many cases by increasing social inequalities, Helliwell casts doubt on the central premise of this reasoning: even in the case of an economy with a fairly modest internal market which is strongly turned towards international trade, as is the case with Canada, political flexibility might still be very significant.

A recent analysis by Jenson and Pochet (2002) explores the very significant extent of this flexibility in the European Union: the “open method of coordination” has led, in the areas of employment and social exclusion, to the developing of audacious, convergent policies between nation-states, at the very time when the apparent steam-roller of the common currency appeared to be threatening social programs and leading to the lowest common denominator. Social ministries and movements are therefore not entirely at the mercy of economic actors and factors.

Given these contradictory pressures, we might wonder whether the distance, limited but significant, that we have observed between the welfare regimes in Canada and the United States is shown uniformly in the four provinces studied. On the contrary, might some of them have a tendency towards convergence or divergence with the liberal, or ultraliberal, model which prevails to the south? Does interprovincial trade, so important for all provinces including Quebec, restrict their flexibility on social aspects to the point of making them very similar to each other and to Canada’s profile? Obviously, the answer could not be solely economic, which leads us to deal with the political factors.

### **The Hazards of Social Policy in a Federal System**

Primary among political factors, of course, is the issue of powers devolved by the constitution to federal and provincial governments. The latter have exclusive responsibility for social security, health, education and municipal affairs, which seems, at first glance, to favour marked diversification among the provinces as to how social issues are handled. The provincial governments have a primary role since they contributed about 45 percent of government expenditure in the four provinces that we are analyzing (the highest proportions were in Quebec and British Columbia), whereas the federal government contributed about 38 percent and municipalities the remainder.<sup>7</sup>

But of course, the federal government is not at all absent from the area of social policy, on which it often imposes its mark. Its transfers have a direct impact on individuals, as is the case with the employment insurance program, and, most often, an indirect, major impact on the financing of transfers and services for which provinces are responsible, though they observe national standards.

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<sup>7</sup> We would like to emphasize another indication of the provinces’ autonomy and of the extent to which Quebec, in particular, is prepared to use it: research and development expenditure there represents 2.42% of GDP, almost the OECD mean level and more than the rest of Canada (1.83%), even more than the economically dominant province, Ontario (2.23%) (Statistics Canada, 2003). Similarly, Quebec is the only province where companies are required by law to spend one percent of their sales figure on vocational training each year, failing which they must pay the equivalent in taxes. In both cases, we can easily imagine the results of these policies on employment and education, and therefore on social situations.

Including Canadian provinces in an international comparative analysis, as we are going to do here, adds a new dimension to a comparison of this kind. The pressures of economic globalization on nation-states' social and fiscal policies are exerted through two levers, namely, the circulation of capital and the circulation of goods. Capital apparently avoids countries which are too greedy fiscally and countries where too generous social programs would cause them to become indebted and less solvent. Also, countries whose prices are swollen by high social costs might find it difficult to export their products. The resilience of welfare regimes, which are still well installed as we have recalled above, shows that things are not quite so simple, even though we cannot deny the importance of economic pressures.

However, when we are dealing with provinces from the same country, as is the case here, a third lever is added to the other two, the free circulation of people. We might therefore anticipate a trend towards harmonizing social situations and policies, to the extent to which unsatisfied individuals might move to provinces offering fiscal and social conditions more appropriate for their own situations. These movements would tend to cause what economists call "races to the bottom." Individuals would move from one province to another to look for either the most generous social programs or the most advantageous tax regime, depending on their needs – this reasoning obviously disregards cultural identities, a phenomenon to which we will return in the next section. Increasingly encumbered with needy people and gradually losing their most well-off taxpayers, the most generous provinces would soon be forced to change their social policies to match the lowest common denominator, which their "competitors" would already have reached. Scharpf (2000) shows clearly that it is difficult to develop compromises to prevent such races to the social minimum. But at the same time, in his opinion, the historic context plays an important role, by tempering economic pressures through political means.

What do empirical studies on the Canadian situation tell us about this? Noël (1998), talking of the "three social unions," clearly describes these tensions around social policy and the difficulties of intergovernmental consensus. Interpretations of the Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA) are fairly divergent, as shown by Théret (1999) and Boismenu and Jenson (1998). Excessive centralization as a result of merchandising between too unequal partners? Reaffirmation of fairly generous principals of social policy and innovation in a context where interdependencies among the various policies, and consequently between levels of government, are taken into account? Increased flexibility for provinces with divergent social agendas? We do not have to decide here, since these events are subsequent to the period for which we have data.

But the long debates that preceded SUFA clearly indicate the contradictory pressures that delineate provinces' flexibility: they have different social visions, a particular national aim in the case of Quebec, and major financial constraints, with the increase in social inequalities before taxes and transfers. The federal government, on the other hand, has partially unloaded some of its responsibilities (coverage for unemployment and public assistance in particular) and therefore has resources to support its political initiatives (Théret, 1999: 76). Moreover, as an OECD report shows (see SDC: 2000), standards for social programs vary considerably from one province to another,<sup>8</sup> but in the aftermath of SUFA and the CHST, the provinces have new incentives to

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<sup>8</sup> For example, the proportion of people receiving social assistance varied, in the late 1990's, from five to six percent in Alberta to nearly 10 percent in New Brunswick. And the heads of single parent families received

reduce the number of recipients and ensure that “social assistance [...] no longer necessarily guarantees an acceptable standard of living for an extended period of time, but rather [...] serves as temporary support to keep people from becoming destitute until their efforts to re-enter the labour force bear fruit” (SDC: 2000: 2).<sup>9</sup>

Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Théret finds it “extremely difficult to categorize” the social policies of the late 1990s (Théret, 1999: 121); according to him, they are a response to the many pressures of globalization and the difficulties of coordinating policies in a federal political system. The fundamental dilemma concerns how to handle the issue of social inequalities: in the United States, they are considered as incentives to work, indispensable to economic development, whereas Canada apparently tries harder to overcome them in order to develop human capital, social capital and social cohesion, fundamental guarantors of economic development (Théret, 1999: 43-44). This leads to a whole set of contradictions: between continental economic integration, which calls for harmonization of standards and policies, and a desire to affirm cultural specificity and a distinct identity; between neo-liberal individualism and collective mobilization; between the desire to exert a gentle power, based on information and trust, and the impossibility of clearly stating a national agenda, given these contradictions; between the need to take bold, often unilateral, action and the indispensable compromises of a federal system (Théret, 1999: 45-47).

Although, in the dominant Canadian tradition, social inequalities must be combatted, but without putting obstacles in the way of continental and global economic integration, we can easily imagine that the provinces might express in their policies the positions that each one takes faced with this dilemma; as we have stated previously, the dominant political trends in the various provinces in 1996-97 should lead to strong neo-liberal perspectives in Alberta, more leftist tendencies in Quebec and probably centrist trends in Ontario and British Columbia. Thirdly, we may bring some element of a solution to a problem raised by Théret (1999:121), who complains that many documents and analyses use categories which are too simple.

In closing this section, we would like to mention three other studies which have dealt with the issue of Canadian provinces’ flexibility even more directly. Jenson and Thompson (1999) make a comparative review of family policy in six Canadian provinces, concluding that there is great diversity in programs and in levels of and conditions for transfers and tax measures for children.

Jenson (2002) has also clearly shown how Quebec has gone against the current with the family policy it implemented starting in 1996: selective family allowances, reduced cost universal child care and an attempt to improve parental leaves, all elements which are contrary to the liberal welfare model. However, Quebec is not trying to return to a previous golden age of welfare (indeed, it is also distancing itself from contemporary European trends), but rather looking for new foundations for Quebec social solidarity, which might be used for the sovereigntist project of the government in power at that time. We must remember that, at least in the case of this province and in the social policy area, autonomy and change are entirely possible under the Canadian fiscal and constitutional framework.

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assistance without having to look for work until their children were six months old in Alberta, and the age of majority in New Brunswick.

<sup>9</sup> See also Théret, 1999: 78

Morel (2002), proposes a theoretical framework which distinguishes two types of “contracts of social assistance reciprocity” between the poor and the state: the “workfare” approach, developed primarily in the United States, and the insertion approach, preferred in France. The contrasts between them are very numerous. The “workfare” system is decentralized (favouring the race to the bottom); it divides the poor into specific categories, looking in particular to distinguish the “dependants” of social assistance and those, less common, who deserve it; it looks for social integration almost exclusively in terms of insertion into the workplace. The insertion model, on the other hand, is centralized; it focuses on the “excluded,” who are not responsible for the lack of employment; it applies an integrated approach to their position, based on solidarity; and insertion has both social and occupational dimensions.

Morel reviews all social assistance policies to categorize some Canadian provinces, particularly Quebec and Ontario. She concludes, to be fair by reviewing a period which goes beyond ours and includes the early 2000s, that both provinces belong to the “workfare” model, the obligation to work gradually replacing family obligations, although Quebec represents a more hybrid model, a softer version compared with Ontario’s neo-liberal hard version.

### **Cultural Identities, National Identities and Social Policy**

Each of the Canadian provinces has a different political tradition, which we have briefly alluded to. But if we take a wider perspective, Quebec has by far the most significant differences compared with the rest of Canada, because of its different language and history and the desire for national affirmation which mobilizes a large majority of the French-speaking population.<sup>10</sup>

We have already stated that Jenson (2002) sees Quebec family policy as an instrument for affirming national identity and the same theme runs through Théret’s work (1999). But it is Béland and Lecours (2003) who raise the issue of the relationship between national identity and social policy in full. Now that the great debates on linguistic issues are almost settled in Quebec, Flanders and Catalonia, these “regions,” which have fairly extensive powers in terms of social policy, have seen these issues as the way of pursuing affirmation of national specificity, without running the risk of being accused of ethnic nationalism, since these policies do not exclude anybody; in addition, social policy, having daily repercussions, appears to be a preferred way of expressing the great political values of a culture which is a minority in the country, but a majority in its region.

What conclusions can we draw from all the literature we have reviewed to clarify our research question? Welfare regimes are probably not very strongly constrained by economic parameters, particularly across the continent, but intense economic trade between provinces is likely to set races to the bottom in motion if states do not take measures to prevent them. In this respect, the political situation in Canada, particularly since the late 1990s, but also during the whole of this decade, is the place for contradictory pressures. The central government wants both to combat social inequalities and encourage economic globalization; it has a decisive influence on the provinces’ actions, but the provinces still manage to etch into the social policy priorities for

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<sup>10</sup> Curtis and his colleagues have shown that, in terms of values and political attitudes, four large regions can be distinguished in North America: the north and south of the United States, Quebec and all the other Canadian provinces (see Baer *et al.* 1993 and Grabb *et al.* 1999 and 2000).

which they are responsible their contrasting social visions and, in the case of Quebec, a desire for national affirmation. Therefore, we can expect that the four provinces we are going to compare might be fairly similar to each other and to Canada as a whole – which itself displays divergences from the standard for liberal countries. Despite this overall similarity, we may think that some regional peculiarities may be seen in terms of welfare regimes, particularly in the case of Quebec, where social policy has become one of the means of national affirmation.

## **The Provinces are Liberal, but...**

What is the reality? To find out, we will examine our data in three successive ways. First, we will make a hierarchical cluster analysis just like the one we presented above: the dendrogram will tell us where the four provinces analyzed are categorized in the welfare world of OECD countries. Second, we will compare provinces and countries directly and in detail, using the proximity measurement among them on which hierarchical analysis is based: this simply means the Euclidean distances between all the pairs of countries and provinces, such that the largest numbers indicate the greatest differences across all indicators considered. This will enable us to highlight significant similarities among the four provinces studied and the various welfare regimes that prevail in advanced countries. Lastly, we will use detailed data on the positions of countries and provinces against each indicator (presented in Table 1) to identify the variables for which provinces are sometimes closer to welfare regimes other than the liberal regime.


The dendrogram in Figure 1 indicates that the four Canadian provinces, like Canada itself, belong to the liberal welfare regime, which is different from the other three, social-democratic, conservative and +, each of them made up of the countries we found there in our previous analyses<sup>11</sup> (Saint-Arnaud and Bernard, 2003). If, however, we create a fifth cluster, it divides the group of liberal countries into two subsets: the first, “North American,” includes the United States, Canada and its four provinces; the second subgroup, “British,” is made up of the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Ireland and Iceland.

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<sup>11</sup> We used the Tukey B and F tests to detect which variables were not contributing significantly to the classification. We withdrew them from the model without any effect on the clusters.



Figure 1. Hierarchical Cluster Analysis of Countries and Provinces (1993-1997)



We could go further with the number of clusters to try to divide up the block of provinces and thus reveal their peculiarities, beyond their common membership of the North-American liberal type. An analysis with eight clusters separates Alberta from the other provinces; it is then alone with the United States, forming a block which could be called “ultraliberal.” If we continue to force divisions, it is not until an analysis with twenty-two clusters that another province, Quebec, is differentiated from the Canadian group.

**Table 1.**  
**Position of the Four Provinces, Canada and Welfare Regimes across all Indicators (1993-98)**

<b>Variables describing the characteristics of government programs</b>	<b>Alberta</b>	<b>British Columbia</b>	<b>Ontario</b>	<b>Quebec</b>	<b>Canada</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>Liberal</b>	<b>Social-Democratic</b>	<b>Conservative</b>	<b>Familiastic</b>
General government expenditures for 1996 (% of GDP), broken down as:	34.6	39.6	35.5	48.6	42.8	32.7	37.8	55.3	48.9	45.9
Final government consumption for 1996 (% of GDP)	17.6	19.2	20.3	23.4	21.3	15.0	19.0	24.1	21.8	17.4
Social security transfers for 1996 (% of GDP)	8.4	11.2	12.0	14.2	12.9	12.9	11.6	19.2	17.8	14.5
Debt interest payments for 1994 (% of GDP)	8.2	7.6	8.4	10.5	9.7	4.2	6.5	5.6	5.1	10.0
General government receipts for 1996 (% of GDP)	37.3	43.1	40.4	47.5	44.1	32.3	39.5	56.4	48.2	42.1
Payroll taxes for 1997 (% of GDP)	3.8	5.0	5.6	7.3	6.0	7.0	4.6	10.2	17.3	12.2
Income tax of unmarried individual workers as percentage of gross earnings in 1996	21	22	23	21	22	18	21.1	29.0	14.4	10.0
Public expenditure on health as % of all public expenditures for 1996	15.6	17.3	15.7	13.3	14.9	20.0	15.5	10.9	13.0	11.6
Public expenditure on health as % of total health expenditure	4.7	7.1	6.0	6.8	6.4	6.3	6.1	6.5	6.8	5.4
Number of physicians per 1,000 people (1996)	1.6	1.9	1.8	2.1	2.1	2.6	2.1	2.9	3.0	4.2
National education expenditure (% of GDP)	5.4	7.0	6.4	7.7	7.6	5.3	6.3	8.1	5.4	4.5
Public expenditure on vocational training (% of GDP)	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.04	0.2	0.6	0.3	0.2
* Number of years since the first law on old age, disability and death	73	73	73	73	73	65	81.7	80.8	92.6	73.3
Number of years since the first law on sickness and maternity	16	16	16	16	16	35	43.2	86.3	95.2	75.5
Number of years since the first law on unemployment insurance	60	60	60	60	60	65	64.8	84.0	82.4	60.5
Number of years since the first law on work injuries	82	84	85	72	85	92	88.3	103	105.4	93.8
* Number of years since the first law on family allowances	56	56	56	56	56	55	57.6	51.8	59.4	56.3

**Table 1 (cont'd)**

<b>Social Situation Variables</b>	<b>Alberta</b>	<b>British Columbia</b>	<b>Ontario</b>	<b>Quebec</b>	<b>Canada</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>Liberal</b>	<b>Social-Democratic</b>	<b>Conservative</b>	<b>Familiastic</b>
* Unemployment rate as percentage of the active population for 1997	5.9	8.6	8.2	11.3	9.2	4.9	7.7	8.1	8.9	12.5
Long-term unemployment (12 months or more) as % of total unemployment for 1997	8.5	14.0	15.9	19.5	16.1	8.7	22.2	25.3	45.4	58.3
*GDP growth rate for 1990-1997 (annual mean variation in volume %)	2.0	2.3	1.7	1.6	1.8	2.8	2.6	2.1	2.3	2.2
Rate of government employment as % of total employment for 1995	16.3	16.9	16.9	20.2	18.0	15.4	16.4	29.9	17.1	16.0
Rate of inflation for 1996	2.2	.9	1.5	1.6	1.6	2.6	2.0	1.9	1.6	5.7
Employment rate for 1997 (workers as a percentage of resident population)	54.6	51.5	51.6	49.4	51.9	50.2	50.4	51.1	46.5	43.1
Female labour participation rate (1997)	73.9	73.9	69.8	64.0	68.3	71.3	67.7	74.2	60.4	51.0
Infant mortality rate for 1995 (deaths of infants under one year old per 1,000 live births)	6.2	5.1	5.7	4.6	6.0	8.0	6.1	4.4	5.6	6.8
Fertility rate for 1996 (mean number of children per woman aged 15-49)	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	2.1	1.8	1.8	1.5	1.3
* Life expectancy at birth for 1997	78	78	78	77	78	77	77.7	77.3	77.6	77.3
R & D scientists and technicians per 1,000 people for 1990-96	3.2	3.0	5.7	5.0	3.7	3.6	3.7	5.5	4.0	1.6
<b>Political Processes Variables</b>										
* Voter turnout in latest elections for the lower or single chamber as a percentage	59	66	66	73	69	36	70.6	78.3	80.6	75.8
Daily newspapers read per 1,000 people for 1990/1996	159.3	90.9	200.0	123.9	159.0	214.9	225	449	258	108
Proportion of employees with union membership for 1995	20.4	29.3	25.0	35.1	27.9	14.2	33.6	77.1	31.8	28.2
* Variables not significant according to the Tukey b test										

The proximity matrix gives us very interesting indications on the relationships that the provinces may have with other regimes, beyond the basic similarity. Table 2 presents these proximities based on various countries and groups which are instructive for this.

**Table 2. Proximity Matrix across Canadian Provinces and Various Sets of Countries**

<b>Regimes</b>	<b>Quebec</b>	<b>Ontario</b>	<b>Alberta</b>	<b>British Columbia</b>
<i>Liberal (Australia, Canada, United States, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Ireland and Iceland)</i>	3.222	2.111	2.356	2.342
<i>Liberal (Australia, Canada, United States, New Zealand, United Kingdom)</i>	2.722	1.608	1.852	1.847
<i>Canada</i>	0.735	0.387	1.015	0.381
<i>United States</i>	4.104	1.994	1.686	2.311
<i>Liberal excluding Canada and United States</i>	3.543	2.479	2.758	2.740
<i>Liberal excluding Canada, United States, Ireland and Iceland</i>	2.924	1.887	2.187	2.182
<i>Social-Democratic (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland)</i>	4.013	4.929	6.679	5.201
<i>Conservative (Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, France)</i>	3.657	3.827	5.290	3.911
<i>Familiastic (Portugal, Italy, Spain, Greece)</i>	4.751	4.907	5.364	4.907
Quebec		0.946	2.256	0.964
Ontario			0.669	0.522
Alberta				1.006

As the cluster analysis had indicated, Alberta (with a distance of 1.015) and Quebec (0.735) are the provinces most different from Canada as a whole, whereas Ontario (0.387) and British Columbia (0.381) are more similar to it. In the case of Alberta, this divergence reflects a strong similarity to the United States (although the distance of 1.686 with this country is clearly higher than the distance separating it from Canada). Ontario is also not very far from the American profile (1.994) or from the liberal profile as a whole.<sup>12</sup> The distance compared with the two reference poles is still a bit greater in the case of British Columbia. As for Quebec, it displays the greatest distances from the United States and the liberal model of all the provinces.

We are even less able to question all provinces being members of the liberal welfare regime since their distances from the other regimes are much more pronounced in all cases. Thus, even Quebec, whose distance from all liberal countries is 3.222), is only similar to the conservative countries at 3.917 and social-democratic ones at 4.206; however, we must note that this distance is very similar to the distance between it and the United States (4.104). Thus, it is by far the province with the greatest affinity to the European models, whereas Alberta is a maximum distance away from them, in particular with respect to the social-democratic regime (6.679);

<sup>12</sup> We provide several estimates of the liberal profile, which actually provide convergent results: sometimes we included all related countries in the dendrogram, whereas in other cases we excluded Ireland and Iceland – our analyses indicate that these countries belong to this type but they have not been included in many other studies. We also excluded, for some comparisons, the United States and Canada, for which we provide proximities calculated separately.

indeed, these two provinces are the most dissimilar (2.256). Ontario and British Columbia are in an intermediate situation between the other two provinces: firmly entrenched in the liberal camp, but with a leaning, weaker than in Quebec's case, towards the European regimes.

Table 3 identifies the variables that give the various provinces their specificity.<sup>13</sup>

**Table 3. Indicators for which Provinces are Similar to the Various Regimes (Except for the Liberal Regime, which They Belong To)**

<b>Characteristics for which the Province Is Similar to the Regime</b>			
	<b>Social-democratic</b>	<b>Conservative</b>	<b>Familist</b>
<b>Quebec</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Final government consumption expenditure</li> <li>Payroll taxes as % of GDP (trend*)</li> <li>Education expenditure</li> <li>Rate of government employment (trend)</li> <li>Infant mortality rate</li> <li>Proportion of scientists and technicians</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>General government expenditures</li> <li>General government receipts</li> <li>Percentage of public expenditure on health and public expenditure as % of total health expenditure</li> <li>Female labour participation rate (trend)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Social security transfers</li> <li>Debt interest payments</li> <li>Unemployment rate</li> <li>Percentage of voter turnout</li> <li>Daily newspapers read</li> </ul>
<b>Ontario</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Employment rate</li> <li>Proportion of scientists and technicians</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Final government consumption expenditure (trend)</li> <li>Rate of government employment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Debt interest payments (trend)</li> <li>Rate of union membership</li> </ul>
<b>Alberta</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Public expenditure on vocational training</li> <li>Female labour participation rate</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Debt interest payments (trend)</li> <li>Rate of union membership</li> </ul>
<b>British Columbia</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Education expenditure (trend)</li> <li>Employment rate</li> <li>Female labour participation rate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Public expenditure as % of total health expenditure</li> <li>Unemployment rate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>General government receipts</li> <li>Daily newspapers read</li> <li>Rate of union membership</li> </ul>
<p>* The use of the word trend indicates that the province's level on this indicator diverges from the level of the liberal model in the direction of another regime, but does not reach the latter level.</p>			

<sup>13</sup> We did not bother including in this table a column for the liberal model, since all the variables which are not there would by definition be found in that column, providing no additional information.

Quebec has high government receipts and expenditure, much higher than in liberal societies and in the other Canadian provinces, and similar to the levels in conservative States. Payroll taxes, relatively high, are similar to social-democratic levels, but social security transfers are at the level of familist countries, i.e., slightly lower. Debt interest payment is the highest of the Canadian provinces, which itself exceeds the liberal level to reach the level of familist countries. Employment in government, which is significantly higher than in other provinces, tends toward the level of social-democratic countries, without reaching it. Quebec's health expenditure also resembles the latter, i.e., lower than liberal states and with a high proportion of government expenditure (indeed, more than Ontario and Alberta); that translates into a particularly low infant mortality rate, similar to that of social-democratic countries. The same is true for government education expenditure, which produces a high proportion of scientists and technicians, as in social-democratic regimes, but also as in Ontario.

However, Quebec's unemployment rate is similar to that in Latin countries and the female labour participation rate is still quite low, halfway between liberal and conservative tendencies. Quebec has low electoral participation (although higher than that of the other provinces and liberal societies) and a low rate of daily papers read; but its rate of union membership is the highest in Canada, although the rate is still typical of liberal countries. What we are seeing here, against the backdrop of a liberal welfare regime, is state interventionism reminiscent of the northern European countries, conservatives and social-democrats; but at the same time, Quebec displays certain features, fairly negative ones, which make it similar to familist countries.

This specificity on the part of Quebec is not unexpected. It is true that, during the period 1985-1994, which immediately precedes the period analyzed here, the Liberal party in power put less emphasis on national affirmation and the construction of an original "Quebec model," inspired by European experiences, than was the case when the *Parti québécois* was in power, 1976-1985 and after 1994. But the Liberals, first tempted to put on the brakes, finally acted very subtly and continued the actions of their predecessors, for whom the intense Canadian and Quebec constitutional debates of the time gave important arguments in favour of Quebec's sovereignty.

Across a large number of indicators,<sup>14</sup> Alberta, on the other hand, resembles the United States, where the level of state intervention is much lower even than in liberal countries; for the other indicators, it sticks to the profile of liberal countries. The low level of government expenditure is distinctly lower than the other provinces and all other regimes, even liberal. It spends fairly little on public education, like conservative countries and the United States; however, a concerted effort is made on vocational training, at a level similar to that in social-democratic countries. The female labour participation rate is higher than in other provinces, similar to that in the United States and social-democratic countries. The proportion of scientists and technicians is quite low and that too is typical of the liberal regime. The proportion of public health expenditure is at the very low level of the Latin countries, as is the rate of union membership, which is barely higher than in the United States. The same is true of the government employment rate.

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<sup>14</sup> In fact across more than ten indicators: government expenditure and receipts, education expenditure, social laws concerning old age, unemployment, female labour participation, electoral participation and union membership.

Overall, Alberta is a “a lesser state,” distancing it from the other Canadian provinces and making it more similar to the United States, with which we have seen that it forms a cluster which might be called ultraliberal. This is not surprising as the Conservative party has had a strong majority there since 1975 and it was preceded in power from the 1930s by the Social Credit Party, itself also very conservative: movements favourable to economic liberalism and thus to a limited state role have left their mark on Alberta over a very long period. Nonetheless, we must remember that this province remains closer to the Canadian model overall than to the United States model, undoubtedly reflecting the extent of federal financial and legislative intervention in social policy; this is ultraliberalism, but very Canadian.

Ontario displays few distinctive features compared with the Canadian profile and therefore also with the liberal profile, at least during the period we are analyzing. Government consumption expenditure and the government employment rate are slightly higher than the liberal norm, tending towards the stronger states of the conservative model. Ontario is similar to the social-democratic countries with respect to the high number of scientists and technicians and the employment rate. The rate of union membership is low in Canadian terms, even compared with all regimes, including liberal.

Beyond the demographic and political weight of Ontario in Canada, which limits the divergences compared with the latter, we may ask why this province is so close to the liberal profile, but not to ultraliberalism. During the thirty years after the war, power was monopolized by a fairly moderate Conservative Party. From 1975 until the start of the period we are analyzing, in 1995, power was greatly divided among three parties, the Conservative Party in the centre-right, the Liberal Party in the centre and the New Democrat Party in the centre-left: the majority party did not control the legislature outright from 1975-1986, and then the three parties followed each other to power from 1987-1995. Even though the ultraliberal model came to power for almost a decade after that, the period preceding our analytical window is characterized by comings and goings and balances of power which explain Ontario adopting neither Quebec’s European trend nor Alberta’s leaning toward the United States.

The picture in British Columbia is also quite close to the liberal model and the Canadian profile overall. Nonetheless, government receipts are the highest of the provinces, excepting Quebec. The same is true for government health budgets and public health expenditure as a percentage of public expenditure (with good performance on infant mortality), and for government budgets for education, without that translating into a high number of scientists and technicians. The female labour participation rate is high, as in Alberta. Newspaper reading is surprisingly low. Thus, a liberal profile, with a few efforts to build strong public programs.

The results in British Columbia are probably due to a history which is in some respects similar to Ontario’s. The Social Credit party, conservative, dominated the legislature continually and quite widely from the 1950s until 1991, but the opposition, which always held at least a third of the seats, was formed by a centre-left party, the New Democrat Party. In the 1991 elections, which immediately precede the period we are studying, it was the latter party which controlled two-thirds of the seats, which enabled them to reverse the political trend. In 1996, the party was re-elected, with a much more equal division of seats and the 2001 election brought to power a Liberal party which adopted an ultraliberal program. The political history of British Columbia

during the period we are reviewing is therefore made up of contrasts and changes, with a volatile electorate, which seems to have produced, all things considered, a situation similar to the Canadian mean.

## Conclusion

Most studies which evaluate the extent of differences among the public policies of the Canadian provinces compare them against themselves. Instead, we have used an international standard, locating the provinces against a group of advanced countries and taking into account a wide set of indicators representing public policy, social situations and the level of civic participation in those countries. That has enabled us to comment on the extent of the differences among the welfare regimes in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia, evaluating them against the differences among the various welfare regimes that characterize OECD countries.

The results of this analysis are clear: first and foremost, these four provinces are similar to each other, they are similar to the country they are part of and to the liberal regime that is characteristic of Canada. Nonetheless, Canada does not duplicate the liberal model in all aspects, and in particular, it is not, despite its very extensive economic trade with the United States, a copy of its powerful neighbour. It is true that one of the provinces, Alberta, displays strong resemblances to the ultraliberal model which prevails in that country, although Alberta is closer to Canada's profile. Quebec is also similar to the Canadian profile, but its tendency is oriented in the opposite direction: the resemblances are found in the direction of European societies, largely because of a desire, rooted in cultural specificity and a political desire for national affirmation, to build a relatively strong state capable of initiatives and innovations, primarily on a North-American scale. The other two provinces have profiles which are less pronounced compared with Canada's overall.

Thus, through a completely different process, we agree with Morel's conclusions, who sees the provinces she analyzed as participating in the same liberal welfare model, but with different histories and emphasis, harder in the case of provinces attached to the neo-liberal ideology originating in the United States, softer in the case of Quebec, which gets some of its inspiration from European states and societies.

Our results correspond equally well to the summary made by Théret when he speaks of the complexity of the Canadian situation, in which there is a profound contradiction between an ideology which wants to balance out inequalities, in the name of the link between social development and economic development, and a desire to play the rules of the globalization game to ensure the same economic development. In this context, and given the federal government's interventions to try to oversee the general evolution, it is hardly surprising that the similarities among the provinces' welfare regimes are strong, while at the same time we can detect dissimilarities inspired by ideological differences, and by the desire to embody national or regional affirmation in distinctive social policies.



As for Martin's concerns, wondering whether comparisons among nation-states are still valid, given the subnational differences, the analysis of differences among the Canadian provinces does not confirm them. It is true that a whole host of very interesting differences would be inaccessible to us if we did not seek the dissimilarities hidden beneath national averages. At the same time, however, we have no indication here that, on the basics, international comparisons of welfare regimes have become misleading.

Nonetheless, obviously we must still find out how the political events of the late 1990s in Canada have changed this situation. An analysis similar to the one we have done here will give us the measure of convergences and divergences among provinces, of movements and compromises which will give shape to tomorrow's Canada. It will also be interesting to contribute more detailed indicators to the analysis, corresponding to specific public policy parameters, in order to have an even more precise portrait of the situation's evolution.

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## Appendix: Sources of Data

Variables	Sources (OECD)	Sources (Provinces)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- General government expenditures</li> <li>- General government receipts</li> </ul>	- National Accounts, OECD, Paris, 1999.	- Provincial Economic Accounts 13-213-PPB, National Accounting System, annual estimates 2001, Statistics Canada.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Final government consumption for 1996 (% of GDP)</li> <li>- Social security transfers for 1996 (% of GDP)</li> </ul>	- OECD Historical Statistics, 1970-2000, OECD, Paris, 2002.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Debt interest payments for 1994 (% of GDP)</li> </ul>	- National Accounts, OECD, Paris, 1999.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Payroll taxes as % of gross domestic product</li> </ul>	- Lin, Zhengxi. 2001. <i>Payroll taxes in Canada revisited: structure, policy parameters and recent trends</i> , Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch – Research paper series, table A3 (p.42).	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Income tax of unmarried individual workers as percentage of gross earnings (unmarried worker with a single salary equal to that of an average worker)</li> </ul>	- The Tax/Benefit Position of Employees 1995/1996 (OECD, 1997 edition)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Spending patterns in Canada (1997) No. 62-202-XIE in the catalogue, Statistics Canada.</li> <li>- Family incomes, census families, No. 13-208-XIB in the catalogue, Statistics Canada.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Education expenditure as % of GDP</li> </ul>	- Education at a Glance, OECD, Paris.	- Education in Canada, 1999, Statistics Canada, no 81-229 in the catalogue.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Public expenditure on vocational training, as % of GDP</li> </ul>	- OECD Jobs Strategy (1998 edition)	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Public expenditure on health as % of all public expenditures</li> <li>- Public expenditure on health as % of total health expenditure</li> <li>- Number of physicians per 1,000 people</li> </ul>	- <i>Health Data OECD 98</i> , OECD, Paris, 1998.	- Health Indicators 2000, Canadian Institute for Health Information
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of years since the application of a policy in a given field (1- Old age, disability and death; 2- Sickness and maternity; 3- Work injury; 4- Unemployment insurance; 5- Family allowance)</li> </ul>	- <i>Social Security Online</i> (U.S.) <a href="http://www.ssa.gov/policy/pubs/">www.ssa.gov/policy/pubs/</a>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unemployment rate as percentage of the active population</li> <li>- Long-term unemployment (12 months or more) as % of total unemployment</li> </ul>	- Labour Force Statistics: 1977-1997, OECD, 1999; Employment Outlook, OECD, Paris, June 1998	- Cansim, Statistics Canada.

## Appendix: Sources of Data (cont'd)

Variables	Sources (OECD)	Sources (Provinces)
- GDP growth rate for 1990-1997 (annual mean variation in volume %)	- <i>OECD Economic Outlook</i> , 64, December 1998, OECD, Paris, 1998.	- Provincial Economic Accounts 13-213-PPB, National Accounting System, Annual estimates 1999, Statistics Canada.
- Employment rate	- Labour Force Statistics: 1977-1997, OECD, 1999.	- Cansim, Statistics Canada.
- Female labour participation rate		
- Rate of government employment as % of total employment		
- Infant mortality rate (deaths of infants under one year old per 1,000 live births)	- <i>For a Caring World</i> (OECD, 1999)	- Statistical Report on the Health of Canadians (Federal, Provincial and Territorial Advisory Committee on Population Health, 1999)
- Fertility rate	- <i>Health Data OECD 98</i> , OECD, Paris, 1998.	
- Life expectancy at birth	- Statistical Database, UNICEF, 1997	
- R & D scientists and technicians per 1,000 people	- <i>Human development report</i> , UN, 1999	- Estimates of research and development personnel in Canada, 1979-1995
- Voter turnout in latest elections for the lower or single chamber as a percentage		- Cansim, Statistics Canada.
		- Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Thirty-sixth General Election, 1997: Official Voting Results, Ottawa, 1997.
- Daily newspapers read per 1,000 people	- World development indicators database	- The Mediastop Inc. E&OE.
		- Provincial Economic Accounts 13-213-PPB, National Accounting System, Annual estimates 1999, Tables and analytical document.
- Proportion of employees with union membership	- World employment report 1996-97 (International Labour Office, 1997)	- Statistics Canada, Labour Force Historical Review.



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